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Abstract—An intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) can adaptively
adjust the phase shifts of its reflecting units to strengthen the
desired signal and/or suppress the undesired signal. In this
letter, we investigate an IRS-aided secure wireless communi-
cation system where a multi-antenna access point (AP) sends
confidential messages to a single-antenna user in the presence
of a single-antenna eavesdropper. In particular, we consider the
challenging scenario where the eavesdropping channel is stronger
than the legitimate communication channel and they are also
highly correlated in space. We maximize the secrecy rate of
the legitimate communication link by jointly designing the AP’s
transmit beamforming and the IRS’s reflect beamforming. While
the resultant optimization problem is difficult to solve, we propose
an efficient algorithm to obtain high-quality suboptimal solution
for it by applying the alternating optimization and semidefinite
relaxation methods. Simulation results show that the proposed
design significantly improves the secrecy communication rate for
the considered setup over the case without using the IRS, and
outperforms a heuristic scheme.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, phase shift opti-
mization, passive beamforming, physical-layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advancement in micro electromechanical systems
(MEMS) and metamaterial techniques, it becomes feasible to
control the phase shift of reflected signal in real time via
a programmable surface. This has enabled a new wireless
device, named intelligent reflecting surface (IRS), which can
be flexibly deployed in wireless networks to improve their
performance in various ways [1]. An IRS is usually composed
of a large number of low-cost, passive, reflecting units, each
being able to reflect the incident wireless signal with an
adjustable phase shift [2]. By adaptively tuning the phase
shifts of the reflecting units, the signal reflected by IRS can
add constructively or destructively with the non-IRS-reflected
signal at the receiver to enhance the desired signal or suppress
the undesired signal such as interference [3]. In an IRS-
aided communication system, active transmit beamforming at
the transmitter and passive reflect beamforming at the IRS
can be jointly designed to improve the performance, e.g.,
transmit power minimization [4]–[6] and energy efficiency
maximization [7]. It is worth noting that as compared to IRS,
there is another technology called large intelligent surface
(LIS) [8], which can operate in either active or passive mode,
while it resembles IRS in the passive mode.
On the other hand, physical-layer security has been thor-
oughly investigated in wireless communications. To maximize
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Fig. 1. IRS-aided secure communication from an AP to a user in the presence
of an eavesdropper.
secrecy communication rate, various techniques such as jam-
ming with artificial noise (AN) and multi-antenna beamform-
ing have been proposed [9]–[11]. However, in scenarios where
the channel of the legitimate communication link and that of
the eavesdropping link are spatially highly correlated and the
average power of the former is weaker than that of the latter
as shown in Fig. 1, the achievable secrecy rate is very limited,
even with the aforementioned techniques applied.
In this letter, we apply IRS to tackle the above challenge. As
shown in Fig. 1, we consider the secure communication from
a multi-antenna access point (AP) to a single-antenna user in
the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper, where an IRS
is deployed in the vicinity of the user and the eavesdropper.
First, by adjusting the phase shifts of the IRS’s reflecting
units, the reflected signal by the IRS is added constructively
with the non-reflected signal at the user to boost its received
signal power, while being destructively added with that at
the eavesdropper to cancel its received signal, both leading
to improved secrecy rate for the user. In addition, the AP’s
transmit beamforming can be designed to strike a balance
between the signal power beamed towards the IRS and that
to the user/eavesdropper for signal enhancement/cancellation,
respectively. Thus, by jointly optimizing the active transmit
beamforming at the AP and the passive reflect beamforming
at the IRS, the secrecy rate for the user can be maximized.
However, this optimization problem is difficult to solve due
to its non-convexity and coupled variables. To tackle this
problem, we propose an efficient algorithm to solve it approx-
imately, based on the alternating optimization, semidefinite
relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomization methods. Sim-
ulation results show the significant gains in secrecy rate by the
proposed design for the considered setup, as compared to the
case without using the IRS as well as a heuristic beamforming
design.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider that an AP with M anten-
nas communicates with a single-antenna user in the presence
of a single-antenna eavesdropper. An IRS with N reflecting
units is deployed to assist in the secure communication from
the AP to the user. The IRS is equipped with a controller,
2which coordinates the AP and IRS for both channel acquisition
and data transmission [4]. All channels in the system are
assumed to experience quasi-static flat-fading. The channel co-
efficients from the AP to the IRS, from the AP to the user, from
the AP to the eavesdropper, from the IRS to the user, and from
the IRS to the eavesdropper are denoted by HAI ∈ CN×M ,
hAU ∈ C1×M , hAE ∈ C1×M , hIU ∈ C1×N , and hIE ∈ C1×N ,
respectively. Here, Cm×n denotes the set of m× n complex-
valued matrices. To characterize the performance limit of
the considered IRS-aided secrecy communication system, we
assume that the global channel state information (CSI) on all
the above involved channels is perfectly known at the AP/IRS
for their joint design of transmit/reflect beamforming. Note
that it is reasonable to assume that hAE and hIE are known
in the scenario when the eavesdropper is an active user in the
system but untrusted by the legitimate receiver [10].
The AP transmits confidential message s with zero mean
and unit variance to the user via beamforming. The beam-
forming vector is denoted by w ∈ CM×1, which satisfies the
following constraint
‖w‖2 ≤ PAP, (1)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, and PAP is the
maximum transmit power of the AP. Each unit of the IRS
reflects the received signal from the AP with an adjustable
phase shift. We model the reflection by the units of the
IRS using q , [q1, . . . , qN ]
T , where qn = βne
jθn , and
θn ∈ [0, 2π) and βn ∈ [0, 1], n = 1, . . . , N , denote the
phase shift and amplitude reflection coefficient of the nth unit,
respectively. Here, the superscript T denotes the transpose
operation. For simplicity, we set βn = 1, ∀n, to achieve the
maximum reflecting power gain, thus q should satisfy
|qn| = 1, ∀n. (2)
Neglecting the signals reflected by the IRS two or more
times due to severe path loss, the received signals at the user
and the eavesdropper can be respectively expressed as
yU = (hIUQHAI + hAU)ws+ nU, (3)
yE = (hIEQHAI + hAE)ws+ nE, (4)
whereQ , diag(q) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
elements are the corresponding elements of the vector q,
and nU and nE denote the Gaussian noises at the user and
the eavesdropper with mean zero and variances σ2U and σ
2
E,
respectively. Thus, the secrecy rate from the AP to the user in
bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) can be expressed as [9]
Rsec = [RU −RE]+, (5)
where [z]+ , max(z, 0), and
RU = log2
(
1 +
|(hIUQHAI + hAU)w|2
σ2U
)
, (6)
RE = log2
(
1 +
|(hIEQHAI + hAE)w|2
σ2E
)
, (7)
denote the achievable rates of the legitimate link and the
eavesdropper link, respectively. Note that in order to maximize
the secrecy rate Rsec with given AP transmit beamforming
vector w, the design of the IRS reflect beamforming vector q
in general needs to achieve the following two goals. On one
hand, the reflected channel hIUQHAI is aligned in phase with
the direct channel hAU to maximize the received signal power
at the user and hence RU. On the other hand, the reflected
channel hIEQHAI is in opposite phase with the direct channel
hAE at the eavesdropper to cancel the signal and thus minimize
RE. In general, there is a trade-off in designing q to achieve
the above two goals.
Our objective is thus to maximize the secrecy rate Rsec in
(5) by jointly optimizing the AP transmit beamforming vector
w and the IRS reflect beamforming vector q. The considered
problem is formulated as follows
max
w,q
log2
(
1 +
|(hIUQHAI + hAU)w|2
σ2U
)
− log2
(
1 +
|(hIEQHAI + hAE)w|2
σ2E
)
(8a)
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ PAP (8b)
|qn| = 1, ∀n. (8c)
Note that in the objective function (8a), we have omitted the
operator [·]+ without loss of optimality, because the optimal
value of our problem must be non-negative1. However, it is
still difficult to obtain the optimal solution to problem (8),
since its objective function (8a) is non-concave with respect
to either w or q, and the unit-norm constraints in (8c) are non-
convex. Thus, we propose an efficient algorithm for solving
problem (8) approximately in the following section.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR PROBLEM (8)
In problem (8), it is observed that the constraint (8b) only
contains the variable w and the constraint (8c) only contains
the variable q. This motivates us to solve problem (8) by
optimizing w and q alternately. Specifically, we solve it
by solving the following two sub-problems iteratively: one
(denoted by sub-problem 1) optimizes w with given q, and the
other (denoted by sub-problem 2) optimizes q with givenw, as
detailed in the following two subsections, respectively. Then,
we present the overall algorithm and show its convergence and
complexity.
A. Sub-Problem 1: Optimizing w with Given q
By letting
A =
1
σ2U
(hIUQHAI + hAU)
H(hIUQHAI + hAU), (9)
B =
1
σ2E
(hIEQHAI + hAE)
H(hIEQHAI + hAE), (10)
where the superscript H denotes the conjugate transpose
operation, we formulate sub-problem 1 in the following form
max
w
wHAw + 1
wHBw+ 1
(11a)
s.t. wHw ≤ PAP. (11b)
The optimal solution to problem (11) is [9]
wopt =
√
PAPumax, (12)
where umax is the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix (B+ 1
PAP
IM )
−1(A+ 1
PAP
IM ).
Here, In denotes an n× n identity matrix.
1This fact can be proved by contradiction. If RU−RE < 0, we can increase
its value to zero by setting w = 0 without violating the constraints.
3B. Sub-Problem 2: Optimizing q with Given w
Sub-problem 2 can be formulated as
max
q
1
σ2
U
|(hIUQHAI + hAU)w|2 + 1
1
σ2
E
|(hIEQHAI + hAE)w|2 + 1
(13a)
s.t. (8c). (13b)
Since
hIUQHAI = q
T diag(hIU)HAI,
hIEQHAI = q
T diag(hIE)HAI,
the following equalities hold [4]
1
σ2U
|(hIUQHAI + hAU)w|2 = sHGUs+ hU, (14)
1
σ2E
|(hIEQHAI + hAE)w|2 = sHGEs+ hE, (15)
where s = [qT , 1]T and
hU =
h∗AUw
∗wThTAU
σ2U
, hE =
h∗AEw
∗wThTAE
σ2E
, (16)
and GU and GE are given in (17) and (18), respectively,
shown at the top of next page. Here, the superscript ∗ denotes
the conjugate operation. By substituting (14) and (15) into
problem (13), we rewrite it into a more tractable form as
max
s
sHGUs+ hU + 1
sHGEs+ hE + 1
(19a)
s.t. sHEns = 1, ∀n, (19b)
where the (i, j)th element of En, denoted by [En]i,j , satisfies
[En]i,j =
{
1 i = j = n
0 otherwise.
(20)
It is still difficult to find the optimal solution to problem (19),
since (19b) for each n is a non-convex quadratic equality
constraint, and the objective function (19a) is fractional and
non-concave with respect to s. We thus propose an efficient
way to find an approximate solution to problem (19) as
follows.
Let tr(Z) and rank(Z) denote the trace and the rank of a
matrix Z, respectively. First, we apply the SDR technique [11]
to overcome the non-convexity of (19b). With S , ssH , we
then re-express problem (19) into its relaxed form by dropping
the constraint of rank(S) = 1 as follows
max
S0
tr(GUS) + hU + 1
tr(GES) + hE + 1
(21a)
s.t. tr(EnS) = 1, ∀n. (21b)
Next, we apply the Charnes-Cooper transformation [11], i.e.,
we set µ = 1/[tr(GES)+hE+1] and X = µS, and transform
problem (21) into the following equivalent non-fractional form
max
µ≥0,X0
tr(GUX) + µ(hU + 1) (22a)
s.t. tr(GEX) + µ(hE + 1) = 1 (22b)
tr(EnX) = µ, ∀n. (22c)
Problem (22) is a convex semidefinite programming (SDP)
problem and thus can be optimally solved by using e.g. the
interior-point method [12]. Finally, to address the omitted
constraint rank(S) = 1, we apply the standard Gaussian
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Problem (8).
1: Initialization: Set k = 0; w(0) = hHAI/‖hAI‖; q(0) = 1N ;
and R(0) = f(w(0),q(0)).
2: repeat
3: Set k = k + 1.
4: With given q(k−1), find the normalized eigenvec-
tor corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of (B +
1
PAP
IM )
−1(A + 1
PAP
IM ), and denote it by umax. Set
w(k) =
√
PAPumax.
5: With given w(k), solve problem (22) and apply Gaus-
sian randomization over its solution to obtain an ap-
proximate solution q(k).
6: Set R(k) = f(w(k),q(k)).
7: until R
(k)−R(k−1)
R(k)
< ǫ.
randomization method to obtain an approximate solution to
problem (13), for which the detail is similar to that in [4] and
thus omitted here for brevity.
C. Overall Algorithm
The overall algorithm for problem (8) is presented in Algo-
rithm 1, where hAI denotes any row in HAI, 1N denotes an
N × 1 vector whose elements are all 1, R(k) = f(w(k),q(k))
denotes the objective value of problem (8) with variables
w(k) and q(k) in iteration k, and ǫ > 0 denotes a small
threshold. Since R(k) is non-decreasing over iterations and is
bounded from above, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge.
In addition, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is mainly due to
steps 4 and 5, for which the complexities are O(M3) and
O((N+1)3.5) [12], respectively. As a result, the complexity of
Algorithm 1 is O(Nite(M3+(N+1)3.5)), where Nite denotes
the iteration number of the algorithm and is usually less than
10 for an accuracy of ǫ = 10−3 based on our simulations.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We provide numerical examples to verify the performance
of the proposed “alternating optimization” based joint active
and passive beamforming design, as compared to the following
benchmark schemes:
• AP MRT with IRS: it firstly performs maximum ratio
transmission (MRT) based beamforming towards the IRS
at the AP, i.e., w =
√
PAPh
H
AI/‖hAI‖, then designs q by
using step 5 of Algorithm 1.
• Without IRS: it does not use IRS and designsw according
to (12) with q = 0.
• Upper bound: it uses the objective value of the relaxed
problem (22) to obtain a secrecy rate upper bound of the
proposed algorithm.
We set M = 4 and assume that the AP, the user, the eaves-
dropper, and the IRS are located at (0, 0), (150, 0), (145, 0),
and (145, 5) in meter (m) in a two-dimensional plane, respec-
tively. Under the above setting, since the AP, eavesdropper
and user lie on a line, the multiple-input single-output (MISO)
channels from the AP to the user and to the eavesdropper are
spatially correlated. Specifically, their channel coefficients hAU
and hAE are generated by hAU =
√
ζ0(d0/dAU)αAUgAU and
hAE =
√
ζ0(d0/dAE)αAEgAE, respectively, where ζ0 = −30 dB
denotes the path loss at the reference distance d0 = 1 m, dAE
and dAU denote the distances from the AP to the user and to the
eavesdropper, respectively, αAU = 3 and αAE = 3 denote their
path loss exponents, and gAU and gAE denote the small-scale
4GU =
1
σ2U
[
diag(h∗IU)H
∗
AIw
∗wTHTAIdiag(hIU) diag(h
∗
IU)H
∗
AIw
∗wThTAU
h∗AUw
∗wTHTAIdiag(hIU) 0
]
(17)
GE =
1
σ2E
[
diag(h∗IE)H
∗
AIw
∗wTHTAIdiag(hIE) diag(h
∗
IE)H
∗
AIw
∗wThTAE
h∗AEw
∗wTHTAIdiag(hIE) 0
]
(18)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus PAP (N = 64).
fading components of hAU and hAE, respectively. We model
gAU and gAE by the spatially correlated Rician fading model
with Rician factors KAU = KAE = 1 and spatial correlation
matrix R, where [R]i,j = r
|i−j| with r = 0.95 [13]. The
other channels HAI, hIU and hIE are modeled as independent
Rician fading with the corresponding path loss exponents:
αAI = 2.2, αIU = 3 and αIE = 3, and Rician factors:
KAI = KIU = KIE = 1. The other parameters are set as
σ2U = σ
2
E = −80 dBm and ǫ = 10−3. The following simulation
results are averaged over 1000 random fading realizations.
Fig. 2 shows the average secrecy rates of different schemes
versus the AP’s transmit power, PAP, when N = 64. It is
observed that the secrecy rate without using the IRS increases
slowly with growing PAP. This is because the channels from
the AP to the user and to the eavesdropper are highly corre-
lated and the eavesdropper is closer to the AP than the user,
thus the channel power of the former is smaller than that
of the latter with high probability. As a result, AP transmit
beamforming alone can only achieve very limited secrecy rate.
In contrast, it is observed that the secrecy rates of the two
schemes with the IRS increase significantly with PAP. This is
because via optimizing the phase shifts of the reflecting units
of the IRS, the reflected signal by the IRS and the direct (non-
reflected) signal can be added constructively at the user but
destructively at the eavesdropper, thus providing a new degree
of freedom to enhance secrecy communication rate. Further-
more, it is observed that the secrecy rate of the proposed joint
beamforming design is very close to its upper bound and is
significantly higher than that of the heuristic “AP MRT with
IRS” scheme. This is because in this benchmark scheme, the
AP beams towards the IRS only, which cannot fully exploit
the aforementioned power enhancement and interference can-
cellation gains at the user and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Thus, the joint design of AP transmit beamforming and IRS
reflect beamforming is essential to fully reap the above gains.
Fig. 3 shows the average secrecy rates of different schemes
versus the number of IRS’s reflecting units,N , when PAP = 15
dBm. It is observed that the secrecy rate of the proposed
algorithm is higher than that of the “AP MRT with IRS”
scheme, and they both increase as N grows. While their
performance gap also increases with N , which indicates that
with more reflecting elements, the joint transmit and reflect
N
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus N (PAP = 15 dBm).
beamforming design becomes more flexible and thus achieves
higher gains.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proposed a new IRS-aided secure communica-
tion system, and investigated the joint optimization of active
transmit and passive reflect beamforming to maximize the
secrecy rate. By considering a challenging setup under which
the conventional system without using IRS has very limited
secrecy rate, the proposed system with IRS was shown by sim-
ulation able to improve the performance significantly, by ex-
ploiting the IRS-enabled power enhancement and interference
suppression at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively.
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